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Employment Discrimination
by Peter Reed Corbin*
and
John E. Duvall"
The field of employment discrimination law was alive and well in the
Eleventh Circuit during the 2000 survey period.' Indeed, the area is
not even showing any signs of slowing down. The case receiving the
most press was the Supreme Court's decision in Reeves v. Sanderson
PlumbingProducts,Inc. ,2which, although an age discrimination action,
will have a large impact on whether cases reach a jury in all areas of
employment discrimination law. The Eleventh Circuit also handed down
a number of notable decisions, particularly in the area of sexual
harassment, the disparate impact theory of liability, and the scope of
Title VII's retaliation provision.

* Partner in the firm of Ford & Harrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. Mercer
University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1975); University of Virginia
(B.A., 1970). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Florida.
** Partner in the firm of Ford & Harrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. Mercer
University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1985); Florida State
University (B.S., 1973). Member, State Bar of Florida.
1. This Article covers significant cases in the area of employment discrimination law
decided by the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit during 2000. Cases arising under the following federal statutes are
included: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)); the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA") (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 &
Supp. V 1999)); the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)); and the Civil Rights Acts of 1866
and 1871 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III
1997)).
2. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
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TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

Jurisdictionand Coverage Under the Act

1. Preemption. In Dickerson v. Alachua County Commission,3 the
Eleventh Circuit considered an issue of first impression of whether a
Title VII claim preempts a conspiracy claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) when the same conduct underlies both claims.4 Plaintiff
worked as a corrections officer at the Alachua County Corrections Center
in Alachua County, Florida. The county conducted an internal
investigation following an inmate's escape from the facility. As a result
of this investigation, plaintiff and six other officers were disciplined.
Plaintiff was demoted from lieutenant to sergeant. Plaintiff then
brought an action pursuant to both Title VII and the conspiracy
provisions of Section 1985(3), alleging that his demotion resulted from
a conspiracy among Caucasian jail officers, who allegedly wanted to shift
the blame for the highly publicized escape to plaintiff and other AfricanAmerican officers on his shift. Following a jury trial, the jury ruled for
the county with respect to plaintiff's Title VII race discrimination claim,
but the jury entered a verdict in favor of plaintiff
in the amount of
5
claim.
conspiracy
1985(3)
Section
his
for
$50,000
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit considered for the first time whether
a conspiracy claim pursuant to Section 1985(3) was preempted by a
companion Title VII claim.' The court of appeals was greatly influenced
by its prior decision in Johnson v. City of Fort Lauderdale,7 which held
that Title VII does not preempt claims pursuant to Section 1983 even
when based upon the same conduct.' In Johnson the court noted
Congress intended Section 1983 to be "a parallel remedy for unconstitutional employment discrimination."9 Finding "no principled basis to
distinguish between §1983 and §1985(3), "1" the court of appeals held
that Section 1985(3), like Section 1983, is not preempted by Title VII. n

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

200 F.3d 761 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 765.
Id.
Id. at 765-67.
148 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1229-31.
200 F.3d at 766 (citing Johnson, 148 F.3d at 1229-31).
Id.
Id. at 766-67.
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2. Ministerial Exception. In Gellington v. Christian Methodist
Episcopal Church,Inc. ,12 the Eleventh Circuit addressed the ministerial
exception to Title VII. 3 Plaintiff was an ordained minister in the
Christian Methodist Episcopal Church. While assigned to a church in
Mobile, Alabama, one of plaintiff's coworkers confided in him that her
immediate supervisor had made sexual advances toward her. Plaintiff
aided the coworker in preparing an official complaint to the church
elders. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff was reassigned to a church over
eight hundred miles away at a substantial reduction in salary. Rather
than accept the reassignment, plaintiff resigned and brought a Title VII
action alleging that the church had retaliated against him and constructively discharged him for aiding the coworker in her sexual harassment
complaint. 14 The district court granted summary judgment,18 relying
Fifth
upon the ministerial exception to Title VII created by the former
6
Circuit in its 1972 decision in McClure v. Salvation Army.'
On appeal, plaintiff argued that the ministerial exception was no
longer viable in light of the Supreme Court's intervening decision in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith. 17 Specifically, plaintiff argued that, under Smith, "religious
beliefs do not excuse compliance with a generally applicable law,""8 and
accordingly, defendant church could not evade its obligations under Title
VII "simply because it is a religious organization." 9 However, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that two other circuits, the Fifth and D.C.
Circuits,2 ° concluded that the ministerial exception survived the
decision in Smith. 2' Agreeing with the Fifth and D.C. Circuits, the
Eleventh Circuit held that "the exception only continues a long-standing
interference in
tradition that churches are to be free from government
22
matters of church governance and administration."

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

203 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2000).

Id. at 1300-01.
Id.
Id. at 1300.
460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
203 F.3d at 1302.

19. Id.
20. See Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 173
F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
21. 203 F.3d at 1302-03.
22. Id. at 1304.
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Theories of Liability and Burdens of Proof

1. Disparate Treatment. In the typical disparate treatment case
under Title VII, the plaintiff proceeds under one of two basic models of
proof: (1) direct evidence of discriminatory intent or (2) the familiar
McDonnell Douglas circumrstantial evidence model.23 Unlike last year's
survey period, there were no direct evidence cases during this survey
period. 24 Rather, the court struggled with applying the Supreme
Court's decision in Reeves in the context of the typical McDonnell
Douglas circumstantial evidence case.
In two cases, Reeves directly affected the court's outcome and resulted
in sending cases back for trial that previously had ended in summary
judgment for the defendant. In the first case, Hinson v. Clinch County
Board of Education,25 plaintiff was the principal at a high school in
Clinch County, Georgia. She was the first female high school principal
hired in the county since 1950. However, a sequence of disagreements
began to occur between plaintiff and members of the School Board.
Plaintiff had a number of intense conversations with one member of the
School Board regarding the Board member's son, who was a student at
plaintiff's high school. Another source of friction was a second Board
member's habit of referring to plaintiff as "Kay Baby," over plaintiff's
objection. One member of the School Board, after successfully running
for election, symbolically "buried" plaintiff in front of the local courthouse to celebrate his victory. Thereafter, the School Board voted to
remove plaintiff as principal and transfer her to a county-wide administrative position. Plaintiff objected to this transfer because she suspected
that it was a "make-work position designed to facilitate her removal as
principal" 26 and because it involved a significant cut in pay. The School

23. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this model the
plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. If the

plaintiff satisfies this initial burden, then the defendant must come forward with
admissible evidence articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment
decision. If the defendant satisfies this burden, the plaintiff then must establish that the
employer's proffered reason is false or pretextual and that intentional discrimination was
the real reason for the adverse employment decision. Id. at 802-05; Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 505-12 (1993); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-

48 (2000).
24. See Peter Reed Corbin & John E. Duvall, Employment Discrimination,51 MERCER
L. REV. 1123, 1124 (2000).
25. 231 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 2000).
26. Id. at 824.
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Board then voted to transfer her to a full-time teaching position at
another school with no cut in pay. The Board asserted that it removed
her as principal because of "basic disagreements" with her approach to
administration of the high school. She was replaced by a male who had
served under plaintiff as vice-principal, who had less experience as a
principal, and who held fewer advanced degrees than plaintiff. Plaintiff
brought a Title VII action challenging her removal as principal. The
district court granted summary judgment for defendant."
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit initially focused on whether plaintiff
had suffered an adverse employment action.28 Citing its prior decision
29
in Doe v. DeKalb County School District,
the court noted that a
transfer to a different position can be considered adverse if it involves
"a reduction in pay, prestige or responsibility."30 Finding that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that plaintiff suffered a loss of prestige
and responsibility by being transferred to either the administrative
position or the teaching position, the court of appeals concluded that the
district court erred in finding as a matter of law that plaintiff had not
suffered an adverse employment action. 3 Further, under Reeves, the
court concluded there was ample evidence to warrant sending the case
to the jury on the issue of whether the School Board's asserted reasons
for removing plaintiff as principal were pretextual. 2 Accordingly, the
grant of summary judgment was reversed, and the action was remanded
for trial.3
In the second case, Durley v. APAC, Inc., ' plaintiff had been
employed with defendant APAC since 1983 and had performed various
clerical functions that included considerable accounting functions and
purchasing responsibilities. In 1994, the position of purchasing agent
became available. Plaintiff applied for the position, having previously
performed many of the job functions and having served as acting
purchasing agent on various occasions. There was no job description for
this position. At the same time, defendant decided to close its fabrication workshop. Jeff Warnock, a male, worked in the fabrication
workshop. Defendant decided to consolidate Warnock's fabrication
workshop position with the purchasing agent position and hired

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 824-26.
Id. at 827.
145 F.3d 1441 (11th Cir. 1998).
231 F.3d at 829.
Id. at 830.
Id. at 831-32.
Id. at 833.
236 F.3d 651 (11th Cir. 2000).
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Warnock to be the new purchasing agent. Warnock had no prior office
or purchasing experience and had not even graduated from high school.
Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge, alleging that defendant failed to promote
her on account of her sex. While the charge was pending and at the
EEOC's request, defendant created a job description for the new
purchasing agent position that emphasized the warehouse and fabrication skills that Warnock possessed, rather than the administrative
duties that previously had been the primary responsibility of the job
when performed by its predecessor. In plaintiff's subsequent Title VII
action, the district court granted summary judgment for defendant.35
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether plaintiff presented
sufficient evidence of pretext to create a question of fact for the jury.36
Under the Reeves standard, the court of appeals noted that defendant
subsequently created a job description that emphasized Warnock's
warehouse and fabrication skills and that Warnock completely lacked
any administrative or purchasing experience.3 7 This evidence, coupled
with plaintiff's substantial prior experience in the job, was considered by
the court of appeals to be more than sufficient to create an issue of
material fact for a jury.3"
However, in three other cases, even the decision in Reeves could not
rescue the plaintiff. In the first case, Abel v. Dubberly,39 plaintiff
worked as a library associate at the Atlanta-Fulton County Public
Library. Plaintiff was the first white female to be hired at the branch
where she worked (South Fulton Branch). From the start, she did not
have a good working relationship with her supervisor, an AfricanAmerican female. Plaintiff borrowed ten dollars from the library's cash
register to purchase gasoline for her personal car. She put a signed
I.O.U. in the register and replaced the ten dollars on her next day at
work. That same day, when questioned about the matter by her
supervisor, plaintiff freely admitted taking the money, stating that she
thought what she had done was proper. However, the county had a
strict policy against personal use of county funds, and plaintiff was fired
for misuse of county funds. Plaintiff brought a Title VII action alleging
that the I.O.U. incident was a pretext for race discrimination. A jury
agreed with her and entered judgment for plaintiff. However, the
district court granted defendant's post-trial motion for judgment as a
matter of law, pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 654-55.
Id. at 655-56.
Id. at 657.
Id.
210 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2000).
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Procedure, and entered judgment for defendant.4 ° On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit found its prior decision in Jones v. Gerwens41 controlled.42 Because plaintiff did not present any evidence showing that
she was similarly situated to any other employee who was differently
disciplined, the court of appeals agreed with the district court that
plaintiff had not presented a sufficient case of disparate treatment to go
to the jury and
affirmed the district court's grant of judgment as a
43
matter of law.
A similar fate befell plaintiff in Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale.44 Plaintiff, an African-American female, was hired as an affirmative-action specialist by the city of Fort Lauderdale. Plaintiff presented
an affirmative-action report at a department meeting that included a
considerable amount of personal commentary such as the following: "We
are still a City plagued with racism, glass ceilings for women and brick
walls for people of color, a tolerance for perceptions of unfairness and a
proverbial silence about it all."45 Plaintiff's superiors, including the city
manager, directed plaintiff to remove her personal commentary from the
report and to draft an amended report that focused on statistical data
in the work force. Plaintiff submitted an amended report but refused to
delete her personal comments. Without approval, plaintiff proceeded to
distribute her report to the City's department heads. Plaintiff was
discharged for insubordination. In her subsequent Title VII action
alleging that her discharge was on account of her race, the district court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.46 On appeal, citing
Reeves, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that there was no genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the city's stated reason for discharging
plaintiff was a pretext for discrimination.4 7 Rather, the undisputed
evidence confirmed that plaintiff was discharged "'due to her insistence
on including her own conclusions in the Affirmative Action Reports
against her supervisors' wishes.'"4

40. Id. at 1336-37.
41. 874 F.2d 1534 (lth Cir. 1989) (also involving the admitted violation of an employer

work rule).
42. 210 F.3d at 1338.
43. Id. at 1339.
44. 232 F.3d 836 (11th Cir. 2000).
45. Id. at 838.
46. Id. at 838-40.
47. Id. at 843-44.
48. Id. at 843 (quoting Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1137,
1146 (S.D. Fla. 1998)).
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Finally, in Lee v. GTE Florida, Inc.," plaintiff worked as an
engineer for GTE's real estate division in Tampa, Florida. In 1994,
plaintiff's job was eliminated as the result of a reduction in force. Six
other employees in the same position also lost their jobs. Under GTE's
policies, plaintiff had the opportunity to apply for other positions within
GTE. She applied for the position of manager of real estate services.
Plaintiff was interviewed for the position, but a male employee, who was
considered more qualified, was selected for the position. Plaintiff
brought an action pursuant to Title VII, alleging that the failure to
promote her was on account of her sex. At trial, the jury entered a
verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $216,000. The district court
subsequently added an award of front pay in the amount of $98,647 and
attorney fees and costs in the amount of $100,000.50 On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that, in a failure to promote case, a plaintiff
cannot establish pretext by simply establishing that she was "better
qualified" than the individual selected; rather, it is necessary to show
"not merely that the defendant's employment decisions were mistaken
but that they were in fact motivated by sex."5' In this case, the court
of appeals found that there was not even a sufficient showing that
plaintiff was the more qualified candidate. 2 As noted by the court,
defendant submitted evidence that it selected the male applicant because
he was better qualified with respect to three of the four criteria listed for
the position: He had more managerial experience; he had more strategic
planning experience; and he had the equivalent of an engineering degree
from Virginia Polytechnic Institute."' Accordingly, the court of appeals
found that there was insufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of
fact on the issue of pretext, and the judgment for plaintiff was reversed,
with instructions to enter judgment for defendant.54
2. Disparate Impact. There was only one disparate impact case
during the survey period, but the case was a significant one. In EEOC
v.Joe's Stone Crab, Inc.," the Eleventh Circuit engaged in a lengthy
and extensive analysis of the disparate impact theory of liability. The
court of appeals labeled this action as the "paradigmatic 'hard' case" and
noted that it had "labored for many months to reach the right result."56

49.
50.
51.
52.

226 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1251.
Id. at 1253.
Id. at 1254-55.

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 1254.
Id. at 1256.
220 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1267.
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Defendant, Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., is a longtime, well-known, familyowned seafood restaurant located in Miami Beach, Florida. The case
involved the position of food server. The evidence revealed that from
1986 to 1990, Joe's hired 108 male food servers and zero female food
servers. From 1991 to 1995, after an EEOC charge was filed, Joe's hired
88 food servers, of which nineteen, or approximately 21.7%, were female.
Joe's hired its new food servers in October of each year. It rarely had to
advertise. Rather, it conducted what was known as a "roll call," which
was widely known in the area and attracted numerous applicants for a
limited number of positions. Each applicant completed an application
and went through an interview with a maitre d'. Hiring decisions were
made on the basis of four subjective factors: appearance, articulation,
attitude, and experience. The EEOC brought an action under Title VII
alleging both disparate treatment and disparate impact discrimination.
After a bench trial, the district court summarily found that the EEOC
had not established intentional discrimination under a disparate
treatment theory, but the court entered judgment for the EEOC with
respect to its disparate impact claim. 7
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated the following three
elements that a plaintiff must prove in a disparate impact case:
[F]irst, that there is a significant statistical disparity between the
proportion of women in the available labor pool and the proportion of
women hired; second, that there is a specific, facially-neutral, employment practice which is the alleged cause of the disparity; and finally,
and most critically in this case, that a causal nexus exists between the
specific58employment practice identified and the statistical disparity
shown.

However, despite the large statistical disparity in this case, the court of
appeals found that neither the district court's findings nor the evidence
in the record could support a legal conclusion that any specific "faciallyneutral employment practice" at Joe's could be "causally connected" to
the statistical disparity in the case. 9 The district court (and the
EEOC) identified two neutral employment practices: (1) Joe's "word of
mouth recruiting" and (2) Joe's "undirected and undisciplined delegation
of hiring authority to subordinate staff."6 ° However, according to the
court of appeals, there was no evidence that either one of these identified
practices caused any disparity between the percentage of women making

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1268-73.
1274 (emphasis omitted).
1274, 1279.
1278.
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up the qualified labor pool and the percentage of women that Joe's
61
actually hired as servers.
The Eleventh Circuit focused on the district court's finding that the
disparity had been caused by "Joe's reputation as a discriminator against
women," which assertedly caused women not to appear at the annual
"roll call" and therefore not to apply at Joe's.62 However, the court of
appeals found this analysis "both problematic and inadequate."63
Initially, the court of appeals noted that reputation is not "a specific act
or a practice" but is "far more amorphous."6 4 The court also pointed out
that reputation, in and of itself, had never been used as the basis for a
disparate impact finding of liability. 65 Further, the court of appeals
found that there was no evidence or logical connection between either of
the identified neutral hiring practices at Joe's and Joe's "reputation as
a discriminator."6" Finally, the court observed that the district court
had admitted the reputation evidence not for the truth of the matter
asserted, but merely to show the state of mind of the women who had
failed to apply at Joe's.67 The court of appeals also pointed out that the
district court's findings and the evidence in the case may well support
a finding of intentional hiring discrimination and disparate treatment.' However, because the district court specifically (but summarily) found that the EEOC had not sustained its burden of proof on this
theory, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the judgment based upon a
disparate impact theory and remanded the case to the district court for
further proceedings utilizing a disparate treatment analysis. 9
3. Sexual Harassment. The Eleventh Circuit was particularly
active in the difficult area of sexual harassment during the survey
period. Perhaps the most significant case handed down by the court, at
least for employers, was Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc.7°
Plaintiffs were two female employees who worked at a Publix store in
Okeechobee, Florida. The alleged harasser was the store manager, who,
in the name of promoting a "family atmosphere" at the store, had a
practice of hugging and patting his employees. Plaintiffs first com-

61. Id. at 1279.
62. Id. at 1280.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1281.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1287.
70. 208 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2000).
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plained informally to three mid-level managers at the store. However,
they did not file a formal complaint with the district manager until
approximately six months later. The district manager immediately
conducted an investigation that resulted in the store manager receiving
a written warning, being demoted to assistant manager, and being
transferred to another store. Neither plaintiff had any contact with the
manager after the filing of their internal complaint. Publix had
promulgated a sexual harassment policy that was disseminated to all
employees in its employee handbook. Under the terms of the policy,
employees submitting sexual harassment complaints were required to
submit the complaint to either the store manager, the district manager,
or a divisional personnel manager. Plaintiffs filed an action pursuant
7
to Title VII alleging hostile work environment sexual harassment. 1
72
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Publix.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit focused on whether defendant had
sufficiently established the affirmative defense set forth by the Supreme
Court in Faragherv. City of Boca Raton7 3 and Burlington Industries v.
Ellerth.74 With respect to the first element of the defense, that the
employer "exercised reasonable care to prevent ... any sexually
harassing behavior," the court had little difficulty finding that Publix
had "promulgated and effectively disseminated" its sexual harassment
policy and complaint procedures. 7' The court of appeals also found that
the complaint procedures were adequate because they provided an
alternative avenue of lodging a complaint with an official other than the
offending supervisor.76 The second element of the defense, that the
employer established "reasonable care to correct promptly the sexual
harassment," required more discussion and addressed the issue of when
Publix had notice of the harassing behavior. 7 Plaintiffs argued that
Publix had notice when they complained informally to the mid-level
managers. However, the court of appeals focused on the language of
defendant's policy, which required sexual harassment complaints be
lodged at the level of store manager or above." On the basis of this
policy language, the court concluded that Publix did not have notice of
the harassing behavior as a result of the complaints to the mid-level

71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 1292-93.
Id. at 1295-96.
524 U.S. 775 (1998).
524 U.S. 742 (1998).

75. 208 F.3d at 1297-98.
76. Id. at 1298-99.
77. Id. at 1299.
78. Id. at 1300.
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managers.7 9 Because it was not in dispute that Publix had promptly
remedied the harassment after plaintiffs filed their formal complaint, the
Eleventh Circuit found that defendant had exercised reasonable care in
promptly correcting the harassing behavior.8 ° Accordingly, summary
judgment for defendant was affirmed.8
This case, no doubt, will have a large impact on the drafting of
employers' sexual harassment policies. Many policies allow employees
initially to file a sexual harassment complaint with their immediate
supervisor. In light of Madray, however, any employer using language
to this effect in its policy should consider revising the policy consistent
with the court's opinion.
Although the employer's policy was the savior in Madray, the
employer's policy was the death knell in Breda v. Wolf Camera &
Video.82 Plaintiff worked as a sales associate at defendant's store in
Savannah, Georgia. She alleged that she was subjected to a continuous
pattern of sexual harassment by a coworker that began shortly after she
was hired. Plaintiff also alleged that she repeatedly complained about
-the harassing behavior to defendant's store manager. After resigning a
number of months later, plaintiff brought a Title VII action alleging
hostile work environment sexual harassment. The district court granted
summary judgment for defendant.83
On appeal, the primary issue was whether plaintiff had established
that defendant had sufficient notice of the harassing behavior. In
resolving this issue, the court of appeals again focused on the specific
language of defendant's sexual harassment policy.84 This policy clearly
stated that any employee who either was subjected to harassment or
who witnessed harassment "must immediately notify his or her
manager."8 5 In this respect, the Eleventh Circuit held: "When an
employer has a policy for reporting harassment that is clear and
published to its employees, and an employee follows that policy, the
employer's notice of the harassment is established by the terms of the
policy."" Because defendant's own policy clearly spelled out that an
employee was to report any harassment to his or her manager and
because plaintiff alleged that she had done so in this case, the court of

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1302-03.
222 F.3d 886 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 888.
Id. at 889-90.
Id. at 889.
Id.
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appeals concluded that summary judgment had been inappropriately
entered and reversed the district court's ruling. s7
In two sexual harassment cases during the survey period, the
Eleventh Circuit struggled with the application of its prior en banc
decision in Mendoza v.Borden, Inc.,88 reported in last year's survey
edition. 89 In doing so, the court reached opposite results. In the first
case, Gupta v. Florida Board of Regents,9 ° plaintiff, a citizen of India,
worked as an assistant professor of economics at Florida Atlantic
University. She alleged a pattern of sexually harassing behavior by
another economics professor at the University that can be summarized
as follows: The professor "looked [plaintiff] up and down" when he first
met her; he called plaintiff at her home at night on numerous occasions;
he asked plaintiff to have lunch with him; he once stared at plaintiff's
legs when she wore a skirt above her knee; he once commented to her,
"you're looking very beautiful"; and on one occasion in his office, the
professor rolled his chair over to plaintiff and briefly placed his hand on
plaintiff's thigh. After a jury trial on plaintiff's resulting Title VII
action, a jury found for plaintiff in the amount of $45,000. 9' On appeal,
the Eleventh Circuit found that no reasonable person would have
considered most of the professor's alleged actions to be of a sexual
nature. 92 In this respect, the court of appeals concluded:
A man can compliment a woman's looks (or a woman compliment a
man's looks) on one or several occasions, by telling her that she is
looking "very beautiful," or words to that effect, without fear of being
found guilty of sexual harassment for having done so. Words complimenting appearance may merely state the obvious, or they may be
hopelessly hyperbolic. Not uncommonly such words show a flirtatious
purpose, but flirtation is not sexual harassment. 93
Applying its standard in Mendoza, the court of appeals found that
there was simply insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict
finding defendant liable for hostile work environment sexual harassment
and reversed in favor of defendant.94

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 890.
195 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
See Corbin & Duvall, supra note 24, at 1127-28.
212 F.3d 571 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 578-82.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 584.
Id. at 586.
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In the second case, Johnson v. Booker T Washington Broadcasting
Service, Inc.,95 plaintiff was hired as a cohost of the morning show at
defendant's radio station in Birmingham, Alabama. From the start,
plaintiff did not hit it off well with her cohost on the morning program,
who also was the program director and plaintiff's supervisor. When the
ratings for the morning show declined, plaintiff was transferred to a
mid-day program. When defendant subsequently changed plaintiff's
shift to a late night program and cut her pay, plaintiff resigned. At her
exit interview, plaintiff alleged for the first time that she had been
subjected to a pattern of sexual harassment by the program director and
her cohost on the original morning show. Plaintiff brought an action
under Title VII alleging sexual harassment, which resulted in the
district court's granting summary judgment in favor of defendant.9 6 On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished both Mendoza and Gupta,
finding that these cases involved "fewer instances of less objectionable
conduct over longer periods of time."97 Finding that the pattern of
conduct in the case was closer to the "continuous barrage of sexual
harassment"98 found in its prior decision in Dees v. Johnson Controls
World Services, Inc., the court of appeals reversed and remanded the
case for further proceedings.'
Finally, in Succar v. Dade County School Board,'' the Eleventh
Circuit considered the issue of whether sexual harassment inflicted upon
a plaintiff by a co-worker with whom the plaintiff previously had 0 a2
consensual sexual relationship was actionable under Title VII.
Plaintiff, a male teacher, engaged in a consensual sexual relationship
with a fellow female teacher. Before the relationship ended, the female
teacher made threatening overtures to plaintiff's wife and son. The
relationship ended shortly thereafter and soon became very acrimonious,
with various incidents of verbal and physical harassment and attempts
to embarrass plaintiff. In the resulting court action, the district court
concluded that plaintiff had not established an actionable, hostile work
environment claim and granted summary judgment for defendant.0 3
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed, finding that the female teacher's
harassment of plaintiff "was motivated not by his male gender, but

95. 234 F.3d 501 (11th Cir. 2000).
96. Id. at 505-06.
97. Id. at 509.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
168 F.3d 417 (11th Cir. 1999).
234 F.3d at 513.
229 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1344.
Id.

20011

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

1381

rather by [her] contempt for [plaintiff] following their failed relationship;
[plaintiff's] gender was merely coincidental."' °4
4. Retaliation. In what no doubt will be the Eleventh Circuit's
most controversial decision during the survey period, the Eleventh
Circuit, in EEOC v. Total System Services, Inc.,105 considered the
proper scope of the retaliation provision set forth in Section 704(a) of
V
Title VII.
' Defendant conducted an internal investigation with respect
to a sexual harassment complaint filed against one of its male supervisors. Eight of defendant's female employees were interviewed, including
Lindy Wright Warren. At the conclusion of the investigation, the
supervisor was fired. Thereafter, however, defendant's senior vice
president of human resources, a female, became convinced that Warren
had lied during the investigation. Warren subsequently was fired for
lying. The EEOC filed suit on Warren's behalf, alleging that Warren
was fired in retaliation for participating in the employer's internal
investigation of the sexual harassment complaint. The district court
granted summary judgment, finding that Warren had not engaged in a
statutorily protected activity.' 7
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit closely examined the statutory
language of the retaliation provision in Section 704(a) of Title VII.'
As to the "participation clause," the court of appeals agreed that
Warren's taking part in defendant's internal investigation did not
constitute protected activity under the statute because no formal EEOC
complaint had been filed. 109 The court concluded: "So, at a minimum,
some employee must file a charge with the EEOC (or its designated
representative) or otherwise instigate proceedings under the statute for
the conduct to come under the participation clause.""0 The court of
appeals also found that Warren's conduct did not fall within the
"opposition clause.""' The court concluded that, even if Warren's false

104. Id. at 1345.
105. 221 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2000).
106. Id. at 1172-73. Section 704(a) of Title VII provides in pertinent part that an
employer may not retaliate against an employee because the employee "has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this sub-chapter" (the opposition clause)
or because the employee "has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter" (the
participation clause). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
107. 221 F.3d at 1173.

108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 1174.
Id.
Id. at 1174 n.2.
Id. at 1175.
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statements were considered protected, defendant had asserted legitimate
grounds for Warren's discharge, and the EEOC had presented no
evidence that this asserted reason (submitting a false statement) was
pretextual." 2 The court of appeals concluded that, in circumstances
when the employer has "good reason to believe" that one of its employees
has given a "knowingly false statement" in the context of an internal
13
investigation, "the law will not protect the employee's job."
This case will have a potentially large impact on the scope of
retaliation claims under Title VII because allegations of retaliation in
the context of an internal employer investigation have become commonplace. Only time will tell whether the other circuits, and perhaps
ultimately the Supreme Court, will adopt the rather narrow interpretation of the retaliation provision adopted by the Eleventh Circuit.
5. Pregnancy Discrimination. In Armindo v. Padlocker,Inc.,114
the Eleventh Circuit considered the issue of whether an employer
violates the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA")," 5 for terminating
an employee for excessive absences, when the majority of the absences
were caused by the employee's pregnancy."' Plaintiff was terminated
from her clerical position after three months of probationary employment, assertedly because of poor attendance during the probationary
period. She had been absent for six days during this period, five of
which were related to her pregnancy. On nine other occasions, she had
either arrived late or left early, in part due to her pregnancy. The
district court granted summary judgment to defendant with respect to
plaintiff's Title VII claim, finding that plaintiff did not establish that she
was treated any differently from similarly situated nonpregnant
employees." 7 In agreeing with the district court, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the PDA "does not require favorable treatment" and that the
PDA "is not violated by an employer who fires a pregnant employee for
excessive absences, unless the employer overlooks the comparable
absences of non-pregnant employees."" 8

112.

Id.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 1176.
209 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2000).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
209 F.3d at 1320.
Id. at 1321.
Id. at 1321-22.
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ProceduralMatters

1. Timely Charge. One of the administrative prerequisites to suit
under Title VII is that a plaintiff must file a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC, within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice.1 9 In Stewart v. Booker T Washington Insurance,20 the issue
was whether plaintiff's EEOC charge was timely filed. 12 1 Plaintiff
worked as an accountant for defendant broadcasting company, which
owned two radio stations. In May 1997, defendant announced that its
primary assets would be sold. After the consummation of this sale,
plaintiff's employment was terminated on November 21, 1997. She filed
a charge of discrimination on February 13, 1998. However, the district
court, in granting summary judgment for defendant, found that plaintiff
had received notice of her termination in May 1997, thereby rendering
her discrimination charge untimely.'2 2
On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed, finding that there was a material issue of disputed fact
over when plaintiff received notice of her termination. 2 3 The court of
appeals noted plaintiff's sworn deposition testimony that she did not
learn that she was going to be terminated until November 1997, and
stated that the district court improperly discredited this testimony at the
summary judgment stage under Rule 56.124 The Eleventh Circuit
concluded: "Quite simply, the 180-day charge filing period does not run
until the plaintiff is told that she is actually being terminated,
not that
125
she might be terminated if future contingencies occur."
2. Class Actions. Plaintiffs continued to have difficulty during the
survey period certifying class actions in the Eleventh Circuit pursuant
to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The latest example
of this trend is Carter v.West Publishing Co.121 Plaintiffs were eight
former and current female employees of West Publishing Company.
They filed a sex discrimination action pursuant to Title VII alleging that
West had denied female employees the opportunity to purchase stock

119. In so-called deferral states, where there is a state agency enforcing a state
employment discrimination law, the charge-filing period is extended to 300 days. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
120. 232 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 2000).
121. Id. at 846.
122. Id. at 846-48.
123. Id. at 850-51.
124. Id. at 848.
125. Id. at 849 (emphasis omitted).
126. 225 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2000).
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pursuant to an employee stock program. The district court certified a
class action, but the Eleventh Circuit granted a permissive appeal of the
district court's class certification decision.' 27
On appeal, the court of appeals noted that plaintiffs asserting Title VII
class actions must not only meet the requirements of Rule 23, but must
also establish that the named plaintiff has standing to bring the
claim.'28 In addressing
the standing issue, the court focused on the
"single-filing rule,"'29 which requires that, as long as one named
plaintiff timely files an EEOC charge, the charge-filing prerequisite is
deemed to have been met for all plaintiffs and class members. The
resolution of this issue, in turn, was found to be dependent upon
whether plaintiffs could establish a continuing violation of the Act
because it was undisputed that the earliest EEOC charge had been filed
more than 180 days from the date in August 1994, when West stopped30
offering employees the opportunity to purchase company stock.
However, the Eleventh Circuit found that, at most, plaintiffs had
established a one-time violation and not a continuing violation.'
The
court concluded: "Plaintiffs assert a single discriminatory act-West's
discriminatory employee stock program-followed by neutral, nondiscriminatory consequences-payment of dividends."' 2 Having concluded that there was no continuing violation of Title VII, the Eleventh
Circuit then concluded that plaintiffs did not have standing to represent
33
the class and that the district court had erred in certifying the class.
3. Arbitration. One case during the survey period addressed
Gilmer-type arbitration as a form of alternative dispute resolution. In
Brown v.ITT Consumer Financial Corp.,1M plaintiff worked as a
consumer loan collection agent for defendant until his termination in
1993. When hired, plaintiff executed a written employment agreement

127. Id. at 1260-61.
128. Id. at 1262-63. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains the
following prerequisites to maintenance of a class action:
(1) [T]he class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses
of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the

class.
FED. R.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

CIrv. P. 23.
225 F.3d at 1263.
Id. at 1263-65.
Id. at 1265.
Id.
Id. at 1266-67.
211 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2000).
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that contained the following broad arbitration provision: "[The parties]
agree that any dispute between them or claim by either against the
other or any agent or affiliate of the other shall be resolved by binding
arbitration
under the Code of Procedure of the National Arbitration
135
Forum."
Plaintiff filed a Title VII action alleging discrimination on account of
race and retaliation with respect to his termination. The district court
granted defendant's motion to compel arbitration. The arbitrator also
ruled against plaintiff after an arbitration hearing. On appeal, plaintiff
argued that the arbitration clause was void for vagueness and that the
district court erred in compelling arbitration." 6 The Eleventh Circuit,
unimpressed with this argument, found that the arbitration clause was
"brief, unequivocal and all-encompassing" and that "[an arbitration
agreement is not vague solely because it includes the universe of the
parties' potential claims against each other. " 117 Plaintiff also argued
that the arbitration clause was void because the National Arbitration
Forum had dissolved since the contract had been entered. Finding no
evidence that the particular arbitration forum was an integral part of
the agreement to arbitrate, the court of appeals summarily
rejected this
38
argument and affirmed the district court's decision.
D.

Remedies Under Title VII

1. Punitive Damages/Statutory Cap/Front Pay. The Eleventh
Circuit considered one significant damages case during the survey
period. In EEOC v. W. & 0., Inc.,139 the court of appeals addressed the
issue of punitive damages and the statutory cap under Title VII, as well
as the issue of front pay. The EEOC, as plaintiff, brought an action
pursuant to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act on behalf of three
employees who worked as waitresses for defendant motel. After a jury
trial, the jury found for each of the three employees, awarding back pay
and punitive damages in the amount of $350,000 for one employee and
$200,000 each for the additional two employees. 4 After the trial, the
district court reduced the punitive damages award to $100,000 per

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 1220.
Id. at 1220-21.
Id. at 1221.
Id. at 1223.
213 F.3d 600 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 609.
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employee, in accordance with the Title VII statutory cap,'41 and also
awarded one of the employees front pay (in an amount of $924.27 every
three months) for a period of three years.'42
On appeal, the primary issue with respect to the punitive damages
award was the application of the Title VII statutory cap. Defendant
argued that the cap limited the total amount of damages that could be
awarded to all three employees combined, whereas the EEOC argued
that each employee could be awarded damages up to the statutory
cap. 43 Examining both the statutory language and the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and also giving deference to the
EEOC's Enforcement Guidance on the subject, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that "each aggrieved employee" could receive "up to the
statutory cap without filing a separate suit or intervening in the EEOC's
suit."'44 With respect to the issue of front pay, the Eleventh Circuit
held that "front pay retains its equitable nature under Title VII after
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991."' According to the court of
appeals, the district court had not erred in deciding this issue itself
instead of submitting it to the jury.'46 However, the court also found
"problematic" the district court's failure to "offer any explanation" for its
award of front pay.'47 Accordingly, the front pay award was vacated
and remanded to the district court so it could "carefully
articulate"
148
whether reinstatement was viable in lieu of front pay.
2. Consent Decrees. Two cases during the survey period addressed
the issue of consent decrees, with both cases arising out of the same
long-standing race discrimination class action. In Reynolds v.Roberts, 149 ("Reynolds 1') plaintiffs originally brought suit in 1985 against
the Alabama Department of Transportation, alleging system-wide race
discrimination. The district court, in 1986, certified three separate
plaintiff classes: (1) one class consisting of black applicants for
employment; (2) a second class comprised of permanent employees under

141. The statutory cap is a sliding scale limiting the total amount of compensatory and
punitive damages in a Title VII action, ranging from $50,000 to $300,000, based upon the
size of the employer. For employers with more than 100 but fewer than 201 employees (as
was the employer in this case), the statutory cap is $100,000.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

213 F.3d at 609.
Id. at 610.
Id. at 614.
Id. at 619.
Id.
Id.
Id.
202 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2000).
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defendant's merit system; and (3) a third class employed by defendant
as temporary, or nonmerit, employees.15 ° After lengthy negotiations
and proceedings over a period of several years, the parties finally worked
out a partial consent decree ("Consent Decree I") that was submitted to
and approved by the district court in 1994. Various parts of Consent
Decree I created new procedures for things such as the rotation of job
duties, recruitment, and training. Relevant to this case, the decree also
contained a provision addressing proceedings with respect to individual
claims of race discrimination, in the event the parties could not come to
an agreement voluntarily. When voluntary negotiations were unproductive, plaintiffs filed a "Motion to Set Hearing to Determine Method of
Back-Pay Calculations."1"' At the commencement of the hearing on
plaintiffs' motion, the district court, over defendant's objection, announced as a threshold issue from the bench that "Consent Decree I had
established 'class-wide liability' against the Department on the claims
of the individual members of each of the three plaintiff classes."'5 2 At
the conclusion of these proceedings, the district court entered judgment
for plaintiffs in the amount of $34,732,487, representing $17,450,077 in
back pay and $17,282,410 in interest." 3
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit engaged in an extensive and lengthy
review of the provisions of Consent Decree I and could find no support
in the decree or evidence in the record that supported the district court's
conclusion that the decree somehow had acted as "an admission, and
therefore adjudication" that defendant was liable with respect to every
Accordingly, the court of appeals
member of all three classes."'
vacated the judgment for back pay and remanded the case for further
proceedings."' 5 In the process, the court delivered the following
uncomplimentary observation:
With the exception of the prospective injunctive relief Consent Decree
I has provided, the paths the parties have followed in litigating this
case have led to nothing but the expenditure of time and considerable
resources. For the most part, counsel have simply engaged in shadow
boxing-all at the expense of the taxpayers of the State of Alabama
and other litigants whose cases are awaiting the district court's attention.16

150.
151.

Id. at 1306.
Id. at 1309.

152. Id. at 1310.
153.
154.

Id. at 1311.
Id. at 1318.

155. Id. at 1318-19.
156. Id. at 1319.
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Summarizing the status of the case on remand, the court of appeals
characterized the prospective injunctive relief of Consent Decree I as
"undisturbed" and stated that the decree had not yet adjudicated
defendant "guilty of anything."'57 On remand, in order to obtain
individual relief, the individual class members actually had to prove
(satisfying the McDonnell Douglas test) that they had been discriminated against." 8
Less than two months later, a different aspect of the Reynolds class
action made its way to the Eleventh Circuit. In Reynolds v. Roberts,...
("Reynolds IF) the issue before the court involved a grievance procedure
that had been created as a part of Consent Decree I; that is, if an
individual employee felt that he or she had been discriminated against
in any respect, the employee had the right to file an internal grievance
to air the complaint. The procedure was race-neutral and consisted of
four steps, culminating in impartial arbitration if the matter could not
be resolved. In 1996, three white employees of the Department of
Transportation filed grievances alleging that they had been assigned
duties outside of their classification and sought back pay relief and
provisional appointments. The EEO monitor established under the
grievance procedure considered the grievances and recommended back
pay and provisional appointments for all three grievants. Shortly
thereafter, counsel for the three plaintiff classes filed a motion with the
district court seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction to prohibit defendant from implementing the grievance
resolutions. After initially granting a TRO, the district court conducted
a hearing and entered a preliminary injunction granting plaintiffs'
motion and prohibiting implementation of the grievance resolutions. 6 '
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit issued an opinion that can only be
described as a clear rebuke and admonishment to both plaintiffs' counsel
and the district court. In vacating the judgment entering the injunction,
the court of appeals reiterated that consent decrees are to be enforced
through the court's civil contempt power and through a motion to the
court to issue an order to show cause why a defendant should not be
held in contempt and sanctioned for violating a specific provision of the
consent decree.'
In this case, as noted by the court of appeals, this
procedure had not been followed because it was obvious that the white

157. Id.
158. Id.

159. 207 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2000).
160. Id. at 1292-97.
161. Id. at 1298.
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grievants had not violated the consent decree in any respect or injured
any member of the plaintiff class in any way. 6 2 The court characterized the actions of plaintiffs' counsel as an abuse of the judicial process
and an abuse that was "as gross as any we have encountered."" The
Eleventh Circuit then delivered the ultimate insult by remanding the
case for the purpose of considering why plaintiffs' counsel should not be
sanctioned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927." The court further instructed the chief judge of the Middle District of Alabama to assign the case
165
to a different district judge for consideration of the sanctions issue.
II.

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

Theories of Liability and Burdens of Proof
Perhaps the most significant employment discrimination decision
rendered during the survey period was that of the United States
Supreme Court in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.166 An
ADEA case, Reeves will have far reaching implications for the burden of
proof allocation in litigation construing all federal employment legislation.
Reeves brought an action against his former employer alleging that
Sanderson Plumbing violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
when it terminated his employment.1 67 The trial court submitted the
6 The
case to the jury, which rendered a judgment in favor of Reeves.
Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that, although a reasonable jury could
have found that Sanderson Plumbing's explanation for Reeves' termination was pretextual, this showing, standing alone, was insufficient to
sustain the jury's finding of liability. 6 9 The court of appeals directed
a judgment in favor of Sanderson Plumbing. 7 ' The United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Fifth Circuit erred in
overruling the trial court because Reeves established a prima facie case,
introduced sufficient evidence for the jury to reject Sanderson Plumbing's
explanation, and produced additional evidence of age-based animus.7

A.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 1299-1300.
Id. at 1299.
Id. at 1301-02.
Id. at 1302.
530 U.S. 133 (2000).
Id. at 138.
Id. at 139.
Id.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 153-54.
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The decision in Reeves had been closely watched by employment lawyers,
and its impact is still being decided.
Several of the Eleventh Circuit cases from this survey period wrestled
with the correct application of Reeves. For instance, Chapman v. Al
Transport... provided the Eleventh Circuit with an opportunity to
address an issue that frequently arises in job discrimination cases: an
employer's use of subjective criteria to justify an adverse employment
action. Chapman had been demoted, transferred, and subsequently
terminated from employment with AI during a company-wide restructuring.17 The principal issue presented in the appeal was the use of a
subjective job interview to pass over Chapman for a transfer position, a
decision that subsequently led to his termination from employment with
defendant.'7 4
Chapman presented the court of appeals with the first opportunity to
apply Reeves in a subjective context. The panel concluded the Eleventh
Circuit's earlier precedent in Combs v. PlantationPatterns, Meadowcraft75 had been effectively modified by the Supreme Court's decision
in Reeves.'76 In Combs the Eleventh Circuit held that a judgment as
a matter of law was unavailable to an employer once a plaintiff offered
sufficient evidence of pretext as to each of the employer's proffered
reasons.'77 In Chapman the court announced a modified standard for
summary judgment in these sorts of cases for the Circuit:
As we have just explained, Reeves tells us judgment as a matter of law
will sometimes be available to an employer in such a case ...and,
because the "standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the
standard for granting judgment as a matter of law, such that the
inquiry under each is the same," ... the same is true of summary
judgment. 7 '

The court also noted that Reeves did not affect the Eleventh Circuit's
view of its proper role in reviewing an employer's reasons for its
employment decisions:
We have recognized previously and reiterate today that: [flederal
courts "do not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an
entity's business decisions. No matter how medieval a firm's practices,

172.

229 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 2000).

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 1018.
Id. at 1016.
106 F.3d 1519 (11th Cir. 1997).
229 F.3d at 1025 n.1l.
106 F.3d at 1541-43.

178.

229 F.3d at 1025 n.11 (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150).
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no matter how high-handed its decisional process, no matter how
mistaken the firm's managers, the ADEA does not interfere. Rather
our inquiry is limited to whether the employer gave an honest
explanation of its behavior." 7 9
Lewis v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n' s° decided whether the Price
Plaintiff
Waterhouse defense remains available in ADEA claims.'
claimed that she had been turned down for employment at a branch of
the YMCA in retaliation for her having filed an ADEA suit against
another branch after she had been fired for misconduct. 2 Defendant
presented evidence below in support of summary judgement establishing
that it would have turned plaintiff down for employment at the second
The panel concluded
branch because of her previous misconduct."8
that the Price Waterhouse defense remains viable in ADEA actions
The panel
notwithstanding passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.'
determined that Congress failed specifically to include the ADEA within
the scope of the provision overruling the Price Waterhouse defense in the
Title VII context.' 5
B.

ProceduralMatters

1.
Sovereign Immunity. Another significant Supreme Court
decision during this survey period involved state sovereign immunity.
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 8 6 the United States Supreme
Court concluded that the ADEA was not a valid exercise of Congress'
power, and thus, the purported abrogation of the states' sovereign
immunity in the ADEA was invalid. 87 Kimel continues the long line

179. Id. at 1030 (quoting Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir.
1991) (quoting Meching v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 864 F.2d 1359, 1365 (7th Cir. 1988))).
180. 208 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2000).
181. Id. at 1303-04. The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), was superseded by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g)(2)(B), as enacted by § 107(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105
Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991). In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court held that an employer
would not be liable for sex discrimination under Title VII if it could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same disputed employment decision even
in the absence of the alleged discrimination. 490 U.S. at 258. In 1991, Congress enacted
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in part to overrule a variety of earlier Supreme Court
employment decisions.
182. 208 F.3d at 1303-04.
183. Id. at 1304.
184. Id. at 1304-05.
185. Id. at 1305.
186. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
187. Id. at 67.
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of Supreme Court decisions limiting Congress' powers and strengthening
states' rights.'
189
2. Right to Sue. Santini v. Cleveland Clinic, Florida
presented
the court with a timeliness question. The district court found that
Santini's various federal claims were time barred because she failed to
file her civil complaint within ninety days of her receipt of a notice of
right to sue from the United States EEOC. Santini's attorney had
received an undated dismissal and notice of right to sue from the EEOC
and requested that the EEOC issue a dated notice. The EEOC complied
with the request, and thereafter, plaintiff filed suit based upon the dated
notice. Defendant moved for summary judgment, contending that the
original notice was the one that started the ninety-day clock ticking.
The district court agreed and granted summary judgment because the
claim was untimely filed more than ninety days after plaintiff received
the first, undated notice."9 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed and found
that the EEOC had issued the second notice merely to correct a technical
defect in the first notice, the lack of a date.19 ' Because the issuance
of the dated notice was, therefore, immaterial to the timeliness issue, the
district court was correct in finding that Santini's claims were time
barred as a result of his lawyer's insistence on a dated notice.' 92

3. Front Pay. Munoz v. Oceanside Resorts, Inc.'93 presented for
the first time in the circuit a fact pattern in which an employer demonstrates that it lawfully eliminated an age discrimination plaintiff's
former position, notwithstanding the age discrimination litigation, which
precludes an award of front pay.'94 Defendant contended that front
pay was inappropriate because plaintiff's position would have been
eliminated.' 95 However, defendant failed to demonstrate sufficiently
in the trial court that, even though his position had been eliminated, he

188. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
189. 232 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2000).
190. Id. at 824-25.
191. Id. at 825.
192. Id.
193. 223 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2000).
194. Id. at 1343.
195. Elimination of a plaintiffs former position prior to trial may preclude the receipt
of front pay. Nord v. United States Steel Corp., 758 F.2d 1462, 1473 n.11 (11th Cir. 1985).
"Awarding front pay to a plaintiff who ultimately would have been terminated confers
windfall upon that plaintiff and contravenes the remedial purpose of the ADEA." Munoz,
223 F.3d at 1350.
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would not have been able to move to some other available job on
defendant's resort property."
4. Res Judicata. The interesting issues on appeal in O'Connor v.
PCA Family Health Plan, Inc." 7 concerned res judicata. The district
court concluded that its earlier grant of summary judgment against
plaintiff with respect to her Family and Medical Leave Act 9 ' claim in
an early suit had res judicata effect on a variety of discrimination claims
she later attempted to raise in a second suit.'9 Relying on Pleming
v. Universal-Rundle Corp.,2"° plaintiff argued on appeal that, because
the EEOC had not yet issued a right to sue notice to her at the time she
commenced the earlier FMLA suit, she remained free to bring the second
employment discrimination suit at a later date.2 ' The panel distinguished Pleming on its facts: "The cornerstone of Pleming's holding,
however, was that the circumstances giving rise to the allegations of the
second suit occurred after she filed the first suit; in other words, the
claims brought in each suit were premised on entirely different instances
of alleged discrimination."2 2 The court determined that the facts
giving rise to O'Connor's employment claims stemmed from the same
nucleus of facts that earlier gave rise to her FMLA claim."'
III.

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

A.

Theories of Liability and Burdens of Proof
Jang v. United Technologies Corp.2"4 also concerned application of
the doctrine of res judicata in the employment litigation but in an ADA
context. Jang had earlier filed suit against United Technologies under
the ADA. That suit had been dismissed because the EEOC had not yet
issued a notice of right to sue. Upon finally receiving his right to sue
notice, Jang then filed a second suit, which was identical in critical
respects to the first suit.0 5 Concluding that the dismissal of the first
suit in the district court was a judgment on the merits, the court of

196.
197.
198.

Id. at 1350-51.
200 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2000).
29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

200 F.3d at 1355.
142 F.3d 1354, 1357-59 (11th Cir. 1998).
200 F.3d at 1355-56.
Id. at 1355 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1355-56.
206 F.3d 1147 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1148.
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appeals affirmed. °6 The trial court was correct to apply traditional res
judicata doctrine, determining that the parties in the two actions were
identical and the causes of action were the same. °7
Earl v. Mervyns, Inc.2 °5 concerned the two definitional terms within
the ADA that have presented the most problems for practitioners:
essential functions of the job and reasonable accommodation. 2 9 Earl,
who suffered from obsessive compulsive disorder, was continually late for
work as a result of the behaviors required of him by the disorder.
Following several warnings and probationary steps occasioned by her
tardiness, she was ultimately terminated from employment due to
further reoccurrences. '° The court of appeals determined that Earl's
attendance problems rendered her unable to perform the essential
functions of her job.2 ' Because of the nature of her job (Earl was a
store area coordinator in a retail department store, a position that
required her timely attendance), the court next determined that Earl
was unable to identify any reasonable accommodation that would allow
her to perform those essential job functions. 1 2 The court of appeals
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment." 3
Cash v. Smith 21 4 presented the equally difficult and fact sensitive
question of when a physical impairment rises to the level of a disability
under the ADA. 6 Cash, who suffered from a remarkable variety of
medical disorders, began missing work after she was diagnosed with a
seizure disorder and diabetes."'
Because of her various health
problems, she completely exhausted all sick and vacation time. Because
of her long history of absenteeism, Cash was not hired into a position of
employment she sought after the employer restructured its operations.
Cash thereafter sued, claiming disability discrimination.1 7 The court
concluded that despite all of her various ailments, Cash was not disabled

206. Id. at 1149.
207. Id.
208. 207 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 2000).
209. Id. at 1365. "Reasonable accommodation" is defined within the ADA at 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(8).
"Essential functions" is defined within the regulations at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(n)(2)(1). However, to a large extent, the definitions are without illumination.
210. 207 F.3d at 1363-65.
211. Id. at 1367.
212. Id. at 1366.
213. Id. at 1368.
214. 231 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2000).
215. Id. at 1303.
216. Id. Among her various medical problems, Cash had over the years of her
employment with defendant Alabama Power been diagnosed with mitral valve prolapse,
migraine headaches, depression, high blood pressure, and a brain tumor. Id.
217. Id. at 1303-04.
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for purposes of the ADA. 21 8 Agreeing with the trial court, the panel
held that Cash failed to show that she was substantially limited in any
major life activity, and therefore, Cash did not enjoy job protection under
the ADA.219
To the same effect, in Durley v. APAC, Inc.,220 another ADA plaintiff
failed to demonstrate that she was limited in a major life activity.
Plaintiff's own testimony on the issue in the trial court indicated that
although her health condition was aggravated by work-related stress,
she always remained able to perform the job in question and that she
always got her work done notwithstanding her health condition.22'
Summary judgment on the ADA claims was therefore appropriate.222
223
Chanda v. Engelhard/ICC
focused on the substantial limitation
Chanda suffered from
aspect of the ADA's definitional morass.
tendonitis and claimed this condition rendered him disabled for purposes
of the ADA. 224 Relying and building upon its earlier ruling in Hilburn
v. Murata Electronics North America, Inc.,225 the appeals court concluded that a diminished activity tolerance from normal daily activities
does not constitute a disability under the ADA.225 While acknowledging the condition of tendonitis can constitute a physical impairment
under the right set of factual circumstances, the court concluded that
here it did not. 227 The court noted that plaintiff's own deposition
testimony and that of his doctors failed to establish a genuine issue as
to any substantial limitation in plaintiff's case.228
Finally, Maynard v. Pneumatic Products Corp.229 presented the
question of whether a back injury substantially limited a plaintiff's
major life activity of walking. 20 Because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his ability to walk was limited as compared to the average
person in the general population, he did not make a prima facie case.2"'

218. Id. at 1304.
219. Id. at 1306.
220. 236 F.3d 651 (11th Cir. 2000).
221. Id. at 657.
222. Id. at 685.
223. 234 F.3d 1219 (lth Cir. 2000).
224. Id. at 1221.
225. 181 F.3d 1220 (l1th Cir. 1999).
226. 234 F.3d at 1222-23.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1223.
229. 233 F.3d 1344 (l1th Cir. 2000).
230. Id. at 1347.
231. Id. at 1349. This decision is potentially significant for what it now requires of
plaintiffs to estabish a prima facie case of disability discrimination. "The simple
proposition we clarify today-that plaintiffs must present comparator evidence to
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B.

Coverage
Shields v. BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Co.232 presented the
issue of collateral estoppel, a variant of res judicata discussed above.2"'
Plaintiff previously brought a state unemployment benefits claim against
BellSouth in the Georgia courts. The state court determined in the
course of that proceeding there was no evidence that plaintiff had been
fired from his employment because of his claimed disability. Shields
thereafter commenced suit against BellSouth in federal court, alleging
that the termination of his employment was a violation of the ADA.
Based on the prior state court finding, the district court dismissed the
suit under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.234 The Eleventh Circuit
certified to the Georgia Supreme Court the state law question of whether
collateral estoppel under Georgia law would bar the second suit.3 5
Davis v. Florida Power & Light Co.236 presented the question of
whether or not a plaintiff who is unable to work overtime is a qualified
individual with a disability.3 7 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed
with the district court that mandatory overtime was an essential
function of plaintiff's job position.3 8 Because Davis claimed below that
his back injury prevented him from working overtime, the trial court
properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant.23
IV. CVL RIGHTS ACTS OF 1866
A.

Section 1981
As discussed above in Part I.B.1., Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale24 ° is a factually interesting case involving Fort Lauderdale's
former affirmative action specialist who was fired after she refused to
remove personal commentary from a report she wrote in her official
capacity. Despite having been instructed by her supervisor to remove
the personal commentary, Rice-Lamar caused the report to be published
containing the commentary that supervisors found to be objectionable.

demonstrate their substantial limitations-has been largely overlooked in ADA cases." Id.
232.

228 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2000).

233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 1288.
Id. at 1285-86.
Id.
205 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2000).

237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 1302.
Id. at 1305.
Id.
232 F.3d 836 (11th Cir. 2000).
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She was thereafter discharged from employment for refusing to follow
her supervisor's instruction.24 '
Although the subject matter of the dispute between [Rice-Lamar] and
her supervisors involved race and gender discrimination, the City's
actions with respect to [Rice-Lamar] herself were not due to her race
or gender. Rather, they were due to her insistence on including her
own conclusions in24 the Affirmative Action Reports against her
supervisor's wishes. '
Rice-Lamar's claim failed most notably because she was unable to
employees were
present any evidence indicating that other insubordinate
24
treated more favorably than she had been. 1
The significant issue on appeal in Koch v. Rugg 244 concerned
qualified immunity presented in the context of the termination of a
Jewish professor from the faculty at Kennesaw State University, "a
component of the University System of Georgia."24 In an informative
opinion that extensively discussed the variations of types of available
qualified immunities, the panel concluded that the denial of qualified
immunity is a purely legal question when it concerns only the application of established legal principles to a given set of facts.246 In these
sorts of cases, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it has no jurisdiction.247
Perhaps the most potentially significant public sector Section 1981
case reported during the survey period is the case of Butts v. County of
Volusia.248 The court concluded in Butts that Section 1983 constitutes
the exclusive remedy against the states and their political subdivisions
for claims arising under the various Civil Rights Acts. 249 Before this
decision, Section 1981 claims were frequently pleaded in the same suit
as alternative theories of potential liability to Section 1983 actions
against public employers.26 0 If Butts is not reversed by the United
States Supreme Court, the decision will eliminate this practice in the

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 838.
Id. at 843 (bracketed information in original).
Id.
221 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1285.
Id. at 1296.
Id. at 1298.
222 F.3d 891 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 894.

250. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Roberts, 202 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2000), discussed in text
accompanying infra notes 251-58.
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circuit, potentially uncomplicating employment litigation, at least to a
degree.
Reynolds v. Roberts,2 5' a class action, came before the court on two
53
252 In Reynolds P2
separate appeals heard during the survey period.
appellants challenged a judgment of the district court awarding back pay
to members of one of the employee groups seeking relief for racial
discrimination in the class action. Both parties entered into a raceneutral consent decree providing for prospective relief relating to job
qualifications and promotion criteria. Based upon the consent decree
entered, the district court subsequently entered a judgment awarding
the members of one of the plaintiff employee groups back pay plus
interest on their claims of racial discrimination.254 The lower court's
determination in Reynolds I was vacated because, in the opinion of the
court of appeals, the consent decree had not been an admission of
liability
that would have entitled the plaintiff subclass to back pay
2 55
relief.
In Reynolds H. 6 plaintiffs (a different group from plaintiffs in
Reynolds I) separately appealed from orders of the district court
prohibiting them from availing themselves of a court-ordered raceneutral grievance procedure. In the opinion of the district court, this use
of the grievance procedure would have violated the earlier consent
decree.257 Concluding in this appeal that the terms of the consent
decree at issue were unambiguous, the court of appeals held that the
district court had no basis for rewriting the consent decree so that its
revised complaint procedures would be only available to AfricanAmerican members of the class.255
B.

Section 1983

Maggio v. Sipple259 was before the court of appeals as a result of the
denial of a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds in the trial
court.26 The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court
in this regard, finding that no constitutional violation had been stated

251. 202 F.3d 1303 (11th
252. 202 F.3d 1303 (11th
(Reynolds II).
253. 202 F.3d 1303 (11th
254. Id. at 1305-14.
255. Id. at 1318.
256. 207 F.3d 1288 (11th
257. Id. at 1291-92.
258. Id. at 1301.
259. 211 F.3d 1346 (11th
260. Id. at 1349.

Cir. 2000).
Cir. 2000) (Reynolds 1) and 207 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2000)
Cir. 2000).

Cir. 2000).

Cir. 2000).
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in the suit as no public concern had been shown.26' Even assuming
that Maggio had alleged a First Amendment violation, the panel
concluded that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity because Maggio failed to show that a reasonable person in
defendants' position would have
been on notice that their actions
262
violated clearly established law.

Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham26 3 concerned a former police chief
and a former police captain appealing from a denial of their motion for
judgment as a matter of law on qualified immunity grounds. Defendants
contended they were entitled to qualified immunity because they had not
violated clearly established law.21

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit

agreed.2 6 The court concluded that plaintiffs' speech was not protected under the facts of the case because of the overriding interest of the
police department in maintaining order and loyalty within the department.2
Stanley v. City of Dalton26 7 also concerned the proper application of
qualified immunity in an employment setting. The district court denied
defendant's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity
in a wrongful termination case.268 On appeal, the court found that the
termination in question was objectively reasonable, and, as such,
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.269 The record undisputedly established that defendants were motivated in part by plaintiff's
misconduct.2 7 °
Cotton v. Jackson27 1 concerned the availability of state remedies and
their impact on a Section 1983 action. Summary judgment in favor of
plaintiff in the trial court was reversed on appeal. 272 The panel
concluded that, because there were appeals procedures available to
plaintiff under state law, a Section 1983 action did not lie.273 Plaintiff

261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. at 1354-55.
Id. at 1354.
230 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1284.

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id. at 1289-90.
Id. at 1293.
219 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1284.
Id. at 1298.
Id.
216 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1333.
Id. at 1332.
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was not deprived of his procedural due process rights because of the
availability of the state remedies.274
Patrick v. Floyd Medical Center275 was a state action case decided
during the survey period. The district court's grant of summary
judgment was affirmed on appeal because Patrick failed to establish
state action to support a Section 1983 claim.2 7' The Hospital Authority of Floyd County was a public hospital authority under Georgia law.
It entered into a management agreement with a private entity to
manage and operate its hospital. While the authority maintained some
control over the financial activities of the hospital, it relinquished all
human resource activities to the private authority under the agreement. 277 Under these facts, the court of appeals concluded that the
private authority could not be said to be a state actor for Section 1983
purposes.278
Thigpen v. Bibb County279 concerned the issue of whether plaintiffs'
Section 1983 claim was barred because they had failed to plead a
corresponding Title VII claim, an issue of first impression in the
circuit. 28 0 The panel had little difficulty rejecting the Fourth Circuit's
reasoning, concluding that, because plaintiffs' claims here implicated
equal protection claims, they stood on different footing than did the
claims before the Fourth Circuit in the case relied upon by the district
28

court.

'

Abel v.Dubberly 2 presented the court of appeals with a reverse
discrimination claim. Plaintiff appealed the grant of a renewed motion

274. Id. at 1333.
275. 201 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2000).
276. Id. at 1317.
277. Id. at 1314.
278. Id. at 1316.
279. 223 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2000).
280. Id. at 1237. In misplaced reliance on authority from the Fourth Circuit, the trial
court concluded that, because of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Section 1983
plaintiffs asserting equal protection claims must also assert a companion Title VII claim.
See Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1383 n.6 (4th Cir. 1995).
281. 223 F.3d at 1238. The Fourth Circuit was relying on the United States Supreme
Court's decision in GreatAmerican FederalSavings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366
(1979), in which the Court stated that Section 1985(3) "may not be invoked to redress
violations of Title VII." Id. at 378.
Novotny's narrow holding does not compel the conclusion reached by the Fourth
Circuit in Hughes. Unlike the Novotny plaintiff, the Hughes plaintiff did not
identify Title VII as the predicate federal law allegedly violated; rather, she
claimed frustration of her equal protection rights, which are rooted in the
Constitution, not in Title VII.
223 F.3d at 1238.
282. 210 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2000).
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for judgment as a matter of law as to her claims for employment
discrimination. She had been the only Caucasian assigned to a branch
library and was terminated from employment for borrowing cash from
the library's petty cash fund. She alleged that the reason for her firing
was pretextual and that race was the real reason for her termination.
She argued that an African-American employee had also taken money
from the petty cash fund but was not similarly disciplined.28 s Finding
that no other employee had actually confessed to taking funds from the
library, the court affirmed." 4 The court reasoned that no other
employee's situation was comparable to plaintiff's and that she had
failed to make out a case of disparate treatment.285
C. Section 1985
McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp.286 addressed the novel issue of
application of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in the Section 1985
context.2 7 The court concluded in the appeal that the doctrine does
not bar a plaintiff's civil claim when the plaintiff is alleging a criminal,
as opposed to civil, conspiracy. 28 In the opinion of the panel, the
"discreet" question presented in the appeal was the applicability of the
doctrine to Section 1985 claims when it is alleged that a conspiracy
exists among corporate officers in the corporation itself to deter by force,
intimidation, or threat, testimony in a United States court.2 9 When
the allegations describe criminal conduct, the panel concluded that the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine does not apply.21 Conversely,
the
291
doctrine remains vital when no criminal conspiracy is alleged.
In Dickerson v. Alachua County Commission,292 the court determined
that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964293 does not preempt
Section 1985 claims.294 However, defendants prevailed in the ap-

283. Id. at 1336.
284. Id. at 1338-39.
285. Id. at 1339.
286. 206 F.3d 1031 (11th Cir. 2000).
287. Id. at 1035-41. "The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine holds that acts of
corporate agents are attributed to the corporation itself, thereby negating the multiplicity
of actors necessary for the formation of a conspiracy." Id. at 1036.
288. Id. at 1041.
289. Id. at 1035.
290. Id. at 1041.

291. Id.
292.

200 F.3d 761 (11th Cir. 2000).

293. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000h-6.
294.

200 F.3d at 766-67.
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peal.295 Because defendant county and its employees were considered
a single entity, the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine prevented Section
29
1985 liability in the case.

6

V.

CONCLUSION

Employment law cases continue to constitute a significant portion of
the docket of the court of appeals. The cases coming before the court of
appeals continue to present some of the more important employment law
questions.

295.
296.

Id. at 770.
Id.

